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Abstract
In this work we analyze the importance of dynamics in the determination of the
distribution of gains from free trade and migration. Given a transition dynamic, free
trade might worsen a country relatively to autarchy. Moreover, some individuals
might lose welfare during the transition dynamics. In both case, individuals find
incentives to migrating, given the lost in the welfare relatively to the autarchy; given
the lost in welfare relatively to another country; or, given the intertemporal lost in
welfare. Then, inequalities in the distribution of the benefits from free trade matters.
Finally, we find out that population size and specialization in production matters in
the determination of the distribution of gains from free trade and migration.
Keywords: Migration, free trade, welfare, transition dynamics.
JEL Codes: J61, C14
1 Introduction
The benefits of free trade seem undeniable. Liberal trade policies sharpen com-
petition, motivate innovation and breed success; and protection leads to inefficient
producers supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products (WTO, 2005).
Thus, liberalization seems to guarantee that all countries, including the poorest, can
benefit from trade. Also, free trade seems to be the best single migration policy that
could be put place (Layard et al., 1992).
Nevertheless, a more formal theoretical analysis shows that free trade might
cause an individual welfare loss. The ownership of resources (Bhagwati and Brecher,
1979; Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981) or the ownership of technology (Brecher, 1982);
exogenous changes in factor endowment or changes in technology (Dixit and Nor-
man, 1980); even transfers or gifts between countries can have undesirable and
unsuspected effects on the welfare of at least one country or individual (Dixit and
Norman, 1980). In fact, might be advantageous for a country to protect their mar-
kets in a world formed by multilateral free trade economies (Deardorff and Stern,
2004).
Since free trade might improve or worsen welfare, this relative or absolute wel-
fare deprivation might incentive to migrating. Consequently, the spreading of free
trade around the world urges to define the impact of the free movements of goods
on individual welfare and migration patterns. Also, analyze if free trade improves
or worsens individual welfare, even in the case of welfare improvements in both
countries. This is to say, individuals can observe an absolute or relative worsening
of the welfare level enjoyed during the transition from autarchy to free trade.
The main aim of this paper is show the relevance of transition dynamics and
price formation in the analysis of welfare in open economies. Firstly, we will jump
from the autarchy to the free trade equilibrium, and show that this jump might pro-
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duce an absolute worsening of the welfare enjoyed by an individual relatively to the
autarchy. Second, we generate a convergent dynamics to a stable free trade equi-
librium, such that both economies are better off than in autarchy; but, during the
transition dynamics some individuals are worse off.
In both cases, the opening of the economies generates incentives to migrating.
This assessment leads to assume that the genuine origin of migration stimuli should
be found in the absolute and relative worsening in the individual welfare level.
Changes in relative welfare matters, relatively to a group (Stark and Bloom, 1985),
a country, or just relatively to oneself, given the intertemporal horizon. If this as-
sumption is true, excepting very particular cases, free movement of goods causes
migration in a strong sense.
But that is not the only aftermath. Under particular conditions, we find out
that specialization in production strongly affects the distribution of gains across
countries, and consequently, the individual welfare in absolute or relative sense.
Then, specialization in production can inhibits or incentives to migrating.
2 Theoretical framework
Since individual are rational, they demand goods in domestic or international mar-
kets, at the smallest price. But, an interesting question to be answered is how indi-
viduals know if prices are really the cheapest one? In general equilibrium frame-
works, the price of an unique good pci depends on the vector of factor prices ωc,
that depends on the demand of this factor, that depends on the total demands of
goods. Finally, the total demands of goods depends on the price pci , which value is
unknown.
Therefore, individuals do not know if is buying at the minimum price. This
3
neverending cycle implies that choosing where and how much to consume be a
hard task for an individual. Each individual must decide under uncertainty about
the performance of others individuals in the economy. The final result can be such
that some or all individuals are better off in autarchy than in free trade.
Unfortunately or not, the above results cannot be obtained in general. In fact,
is not possible say very much about the general equilibrium effects of changes in
parameters without knowing the exact values of parameters and the exact character-
istics of demand and supply functions (Dixit and Norman, 1980). Let assume that
utility and production functions satisfy the following condition.
Condition 2.1 Let two economies be c = 1,2, with Nc identical individuals with
utility function uc(·) = ∏i x1/Ii ; that produce I > 2 goods, given the production
functions f ci (z) = zaci , and a
c
i > 0 a constant. Each country has z¯c = Nc units of
the production factor, equally distributed over the whole population.
Under condition 2.1, the maximizing utility demands are xci = ω
czc
I pci
. Given pci =
ωcaci , the minimizing cost price, under full employment the utility level that each
country enjoys in autarchy is
uc,aut =∏
i
(
z¯c
Iaci
)1/I
; (1)
and each individual enjoys a welfare level equal to uc,autn = ∏i( 1Iaci )
1/I
. Notice that,
in autarchy, the welfare level enjoyed by individuals depends exclusively on aci . This
property will help to analyze the properties of the free trade solution. Let impose
an additional condition.
Condition 2.2 Given the production functions f ci (z) = zaci , the coefficients a
c
i satisfy
the following relationship a1i = a2I−i+1.
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Condition 2.2 means that the utility level enjoyed by the individuals are u1,autn =
u
2,aut
n and do not exist incentives to migrating in autarchy. However, since a1i 6= a2i
and I > 2, at least one countries will be better off in open economy than in autarchy.
2.1 Jumping from autarchy to free trade
Let considers that Country 1 have comparative advantage in the production of `
goods, and Country 2 in the production of κ , and `+ κ = I. Let considers that
consumers simultaneously demand goods where the observed prices pc,obsi satisfy
pobsi = min{p1,obsi , p2,obsi }.
Given total consumer demands, producers will demand the quantity of factor
needed to produce these quantities. Under full employment, we show that the equi-
librium wage satisfies the following relationship:
ω1,ab
ω2,ab
=
`z¯2
κ z¯1
. (2)
At these prices, the welfare level enjoyed by each country depends on the en-
dowments of factors zc; on `,κ , the number of the exported–imported goods; and
on the aci coefficients.
u1,ab(·) =
`
∏
i=1
(
z¯1
Ia1i
)1/I I
∏
i=`+1
(
`z¯2
κIa2i
)1/I
(3)
u2,ab(·) =
`
∏
i=1
(
κ z¯1
`Ia1i
)1/I I
∏
i=`+1
(
z¯2
Ia2i
)1/I
(4)
From the previous equations we obtain that the relative welfare between coun-
tries depends exclusively on the quotient between exported/imported goods. Also,
the welfare level enjoyed by an individual n in Country 1, relatively to those that
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could be enjoyed in Country 2, is equal to the international relative price of produc-
tion factor:
u1,ab(·)
u2,ab(·) =
(
`
κ
)
⇒ u
1,ab
n (·)
u
2,ab
n (·)
=
ω1,ab
ω2,ab
=
(
`z¯2
κ z¯1
)
. (5)
Notice that in autarchy individuals enjoy from the same absolute and relative
welfare level —see equation (1). Then, free trade produced, at least, relative differ-
ences in welfare among countries. Also, these differences do not depends only on
the relative abundance of factors, but rather on the relative diversity of the produc-
tive sector of a country `,κ . Then, specialization can have strong consequences over
the welfare, favoring the most competitive country and worsening the less compet-
itive country.
Therefore, if individuals respond to relative international differences in the wel-
fare level enjoyed, opening markets incentives to migrating, even if the welfare
level improves in both countries. But, we can ask if is true that the welfare level
has improved in absolute terms in both countries? Comparing the utility enjoyed
in autarchy with that one in open economy, we find that welfare improves in both
countries only if it satisfies that:
I
∏
i=`+1
(
a2i
a1i
)1/κ
<
(
`z¯2
κ z¯1
)
<
`
∏
i=1
(
a2i
a1i
)1/`
. (6)
Proof 2.1 Free trade improves welfare in both countries if uc,ab > uc,aut . From
equations (1), (3) and (4) is easy to find that u1,ab > u1,aut ⇒
(
`z¯2
κ z¯1
)
>∏Ii=`+1
(
a2i
a1i
)1/κ
and u2,ab > u2,aut ⇒
(
`z¯2
κ z¯1
)
< ∏`i=1
(
a2i
a1i
)1/`
¥
In general, the above inequality is not satisfied for arbitrary values of parame-
ters. Consequently, free trade can worsen a country relatively to another country,
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and individuals residing in the country that has worsened in absolute terms, have
incentives to migrating, in order to improve absolute their welfare level.
Notice that, the results depends on dynamics. Countries jump from the autarchy
to the open economy and, given the fact that consumers only observe the prices in
autarchy pc,auti = aci ωc,aut , they cannot know the prices in open economy p
c,ab
i =
aci ω
c,ab
. Thus, consumers must choose how much and from where to consume,
given the “unobserved free trade equilibrium prices”. In fact, with this dynamics,
the behavior of individuals is consistent with perfect rationality.
2.2 The convergence to free trade equilibrium
The purpose of this section is analyze the properties of the convergence to the free
trade equilibrium, under specific assumptions about dynamics. Let consider that in
each instant t a new consumer finds out cheaper buy some goods abroad. Then,
there are t individuals in t formulating their demands abroad, given the observed
prices pc,obsit = aci ωct−1. Given these demands, producers plan the production and
offer goods at pcit = aci ωct , maybe different from p
c,obs
it . At t = T , there T consumers
demanding goods at piT = min{p1iT , p2iT} from abroad, and Nc−T > 0 individuals
consuming in domestic markets at pciT .
The welfare of individuals can be obtained observing that in each country there
are two groups: the importing goods consumers and the domestic goods consumers.
The utility level reached by the Nc− t importing goods individuals is:
u
c,ab
(n,d)t(·) =
I
∏
i=1
(
ωct−1
Iaci ω
c
t
)
. (7)
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And the utility level reached by the domestic goods consumers at t is:
u
1,ab
(n,m)t(·) =
`
∏
i=1
(
ω1t−1
Ia1i ω1t
)
I
∏
i=`+1
(
ω1t−1
Ia2i ω2t
)
(8)
u
2,ab
(n,m)t(·) =
`
∏
i=1
(
ω2t−1
Ia1i ω1t
)
I
∏
i=1+`
(
ω2t−1
Ia2i ω2t
)
(9)
Let show how equilibrium prices in each instant t is formed. If producers try to
satisfy the total demand of consumers, the total demand of factors in Country 1 is:
z1t = `
(
ω1t−1
Iω1t
N1+
ω2t−1
Iω1t
t
)
+κ
(
ω1t−1
Iω1t
(N1− t)
)
, (10)
if a1i ω1t < a2i ω2t for 1, . . . , ` goods. And the total demand of factors in Country 2 is:
z2t = κ
(
ω2t−1
Iω2t
N2+
ω1t−1
Iω2it
t
)
+ `
(
ω2t−1
Iω2t
(N2− t)
)
, (11)
if a1i ω1t > a2i ω2t for `+1, . . . , I goods.
Under the full employment zc = z¯c =Nc, substituting Nc and manipulating equa-
tions (10) and (11), we find that the equilibrium wage satisfies:
ωc,abt = ω
c
t−1+(−1)ct
(
κ
ω1t−1
INc
− `ω
2
t−1
INc
)
. (12)
For sake of simplicity, let considers that in autarchy factor prices satisfies the
relation κω1,aut = `ω2,aut ⇒ ωc,abt = ωc,abt+1 for any t ≤ min{N1,N2}. At these
prices, individuals acquiring goods from abroad improve their welfare level, since
relative wages remains constant and the prices of imported goods are lowering.
However, if N1 6= N2 and N1 > N2, at t = N2, all individuals residing in Coun-
try 2 have already acquired the desired quantities of goods from abroad; but there
are N1−N2 individuals residing in Country 1 buying goods in domestic markets,
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despite is cheaper buy in Country 2. Then, individuals residing in Country 1 can
improve their welfare if they buy goods from abroad. From equations (10) and (11),
we find for t > N2 that the full employment wage is:
ωct =
 ω
1,ab
t−1 + `
N2ω2,abt−1
IN1 −κ
ω1,abt−1
IN1 t, if c = 1;
κ
ω2,abt−1
I +κ
ω1,abt−1
IN2 t, if c = 2.
(13)
Then, ω1,abt is diminishing relatively to ω
2,ab
t for everything t > N2. Conse-
quently, prices of imported goods increases in Country 1, since ω2,abt > ω
2,ab
t−1 , and
the welfare of those individuals importing goods from abroad and residing in the
Country 1 diminish.
Moreover, since wages in Country 1 is decreasing, and wages in Country 2
is rising, Country 1 might wins comparative advantage in the production of some
other goods. In particular, if N1 is large enough to guarantee that a1qω
1,ab
Tn ≤ a2qω
2,ab
Tn
for some Tn ≤ N1. If it occurs, wages in Country 1 will continue to diminish and
wages in Country 2 will continue to increase. In this process, the welfare of some
individuals in Country 1 will diminish, given the welfare enjoyed in the previous
period.
3 Conclusions
The results obtained are a direct consequence of considering that individuals play
the double role of consumer and factors supply. Also, the transition dynamics from
autarchy to free trade equilibrium matters. Jumps from autarchy to free trade can
reduce the welfare in absolute and relative terms. Using more complex dynamics,
individuals can improve their welfare relatively to those enjoyed in autarchy, but
not relatively to those enjoyed in the previous periods.
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At this point, the relevant question is (in a world that spreads the free trade):
in what extent the unequal distribution of benefits proceeding from free trade af-
fects the welfare of individuals, and, consequently the migratory patterns? Also, we
should ponder about the stimuli of migrants: absolute reductions between equilib-
ria; absolute reductions during the transition between equilibria; or relative changes
in the level of welfare enjoyed.
The hypotheses relatively to the causes of the migration should to be analyzed
more carefully. In this section we find out that some or all individuals can be worse
off in open economy than in autarchy, at least during the transition to the equi-
librium. In such a case, individuals can desire to emigrate to recover at least the
welfare enjoyed before the opening of the economy. Consequently, the liberaliza-
tion of an economy can produce two migratory flows, with different motivations: a
flow caused by intertemporal or between countries comparisons in the welfare level
enjoyed; and a flow caused by absolute losses in the welfare enjoyed. Moreover,
we find out that the welfare level enjoyed by an individual (comparatively with the
level of welfare enjoyed during the autarchy), depends on the degree of diversity
of production of country, or, on the relationship between goods exported and goods
imported; and on the size of populations Nc.
This result does not deny the benefits of free trade, but rather it questions the
allocation of this benefit. The results of this paper point out that, therefore, the
causes of the migration and free trade, cannot be analyzed exclusively in terms of
flows of factors. The impact of liberalization over individuals (or migratory worker)
and over economies, depends on preferences, technology and factor endowments
and/or population size. Although we have included a only one production factor
in the models, the results obtained should open the discussion on the impact of the
liberalization of the international markets in the poorest countries —more densely
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towns and smaller diversity of the productive sector—, and on migration.
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